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MrGeDiao/shuorenhua
说人话｜中文优先的去 AI 味改写 skill：保事实、分场景、改完可直接发。Chinese-first rewrite skill for Codex / Claude Code / Cursor / ChatGPT — removes AI tone, preserves facts.
AI provenance
0%
explicit
- Confidence
- 95%
- Coverage
- 100%
Estimated share of AI-generated code. Explicit attribution is a lower bound.
Code quality
72/100
adequate
- Confidence
- 90%
- Coverage
- 100%
Complexity, duplication, lint density, tests, CI, docs and review process.
Security
70/100
weak
- Confidence
- 85%
- Coverage
- 100%
Secrets, static analysis, vulnerable dependencies, CI and supply-chain posture.
- Repository: https://github.com/MrGeDiao/shuorenhua
- Commit:
39809cea2d8c006ff590ae7168ba0e9ed4565143 - Generated: 2026-11-14T00:11:51+00:00
- Scorer 0.1.0, scoring prov-4+qual-2+sec-2, report schema v2
Scores
| Pillar | Score | Signal | Confidence | Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI provenance (estimated AI-generated share) | 0 | explicit | 95% | 100% |
| Code quality | 72 | adequate | 90% | 100% |
| Security | 70 | weak | 85% | 100% |
AI provenance
Explicit AI attribution on 0% of first-party code added; an estimated 0% including velocity signals.
- Explicitly attributed share (lower bound): 0.0%
- Unattributed share in AI-consistent velocity bursts: 0.0%
- Estimated AI-generated share: 0.0%
| AI tool | Attributed commits | Lines added |
|---|---|---|
| Claude Code | 2 | 0 |
| OpenAI Codex | 1 | 0 |
- AI tooling configured in repo: claude-code, generic-agent
Current source lines last changed by AI-attributed commits: 0 of 3,650.
Too few lines in one group to compare finding densities.
- Stylometry index: 1.64 per 1,000 lines (narrated steps 0, placeholders 0, assistant phrasing 0, emoji 12). Reported as a signal, not scored.
| Month | Lines added | Attributed to AI |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-07 | 558 | 0% |
| 2026-08 | 3,161 | 0% |
| 2026-09 | 1,522 | 0% |
| 2026-10 | 12 | 0% |
| 2026-11 | 359 | 0% |
Evidence
- Claude Code: trailer 'Co-Authored-By: Claude' (2a3a27a02989)
- Claude Code: trailer 'Co-Authored-By: Claude' (501fda64529d)
- OpenAI Codex: on merged branch (99a9d5ac54) (fd90da17849c)
- CLAUDE.md (claude-code configuration) (CLAUDE.md)
- AGENTS.md (generic-agent configuration) (AGENTS.md)
AI provenance describes how code was produced; it is not a quality judgment. Unless attribution is explicit, these are signals consistent with AI generation, not proof. Squash/rebase workflows, imported code, and rewritten history reduce accuracy.
Code quality
Code quality is adequate: test-to-source ratio 0.49, CI runs tests; 50% of function code in complex or long functions; 2% duplicated lines. Weakest area: complexity.
| Area | Score |
|---|---|
| Complexity (lizard) | 22 |
| Duplication | 90 |
| Code smells (Opengrep) | 81 |
| Tests and CI | 89 |
| Documentation | 100 |
| Type safety | 40 |
| Process (Scorecard review/maintenance) | n/a |
- Functions: 125; mean complexity 8.9, 90th percentile 25; 17 complex and 3 long functions
- Duplicated lines: 1.7% of 2,957 compared
- Tests: 1,783 test lines for 3,650 source lines (ratio 0.49); CI test commands: unittest; 35% of recent source commits also change tests
- Docs missing or thin: none
Most complex functions:
- load_human_corpus in automation/eval/hard_metrics.py: complexity 118, 275 lines
- analyze_run in automation/eval/hard_metrics.py: complexity 60, 146 lines
- check_runtime_manifest in automation/check_repo.py: complexity 44, 85 lines
- calibrate in automation/eval/hard_metrics.py: complexity 44, 131 lines
- analyze_case in automation/eval/hard_metrics.py: complexity 41, 96 lines
Security
Security posture is weak: 2 high-severity SAST findings; 3 high-severity workflow issues. Weakest area: posture.
| Area | Score |
|---|---|
| Secrets (gitleaks, tree + history) | 100 |
| Static analysis (Opengrep) | 82 |
| Vulnerable dependencies (OSV) | n/a |
| CI workflows (zizmor) | 50 |
| Posture (policy, updates, signing, lockfiles) | 0 |
| OpenSSF Scorecard | n/a |
- Posture checks passed: lockfiles; missing: security policy, dependency updates, signed commits
Top findings
| Severity | Finding | Location |
|---|---|---|
| high | opengrep/python.lang.security.audit.dangerous-subprocess-use-audit: Detected subprocess function 'run' without a static string. If this data can be controlled by a malicious actor, it may be an instance of command injection. Audit the use of this call to ensure it is not controllable by an external resource. You may consider using 'shlex.escape()'. [confidence low] |
automation/check_repo.py:56 |
| high | opengrep/python.lang.security.audit.dangerous-subprocess-use-audit: Detected subprocess function 'run' without a static string. If this data can be controlled by a malicious actor, it may be an instance of command injection. Audit the use of this call to ensure it is not controllable by an external resource. You may consider using 'shlex.escape()'. [confidence low] |
automation/eval/runner.py:463 |
| high | zizmor/unpinned-uses: unpinned action reference [confidence high] |
.github/workflows/check.yml:10 |
| high | zizmor/unpinned-uses: unpinned action reference [confidence high] |
.github/workflows/star-history.yml:15 |
| high | zizmor/unpinned-uses: unpinned action reference [confidence high] |
.github/workflows/star-history.yml:16 |
| medium | opengrep/python.lang.security.audit.exec-detected: Detected the use of exec(). exec() can be dangerous if used to evaluate dynamic content. If this content can be input from outside the program, this may be a code injection vulnerability. Ensure evaluated content is not definable by external sources. [confidence low] |
automation/check_repo.py:479 |
| medium | opengrep/python.lang.security.audit.dynamic-urllib-use-detected: Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead. [confidence low] |
automation/eval/fetch_human_corpus.py:222 |
| medium | zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] |
.github/workflows/check.yml:10 |
| medium | zizmor/excessive-permissions: overly broad permissions [confidence medium] |
.github/workflows/check.yml:7 |
| medium | zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] |
.github/workflows/star-history.yml:15 |
| medium | zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] |
.github/workflows/star-history.yml:16 |
Static signals only: the scorer never runs the project's code. Secret findings are pattern matches that were not verified, and secret values are never stored.
Distribution signals
- binary-release-asset: release v2.5.0 ships shuorenhua-v2.5.0.zip (168 downloads)
Signals consistent with a repository that exists to distribute a download. They are heuristics, not a verdict; release files were not downloaded or inspected.
Repository profile
- Source lines: 3,650; test lines: 1,783
| Language | Lines |
|---|---|
| Python | 5,433 |