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digitalsamba/claude-code-video-toolkit

Make videos with Claude Code: script, AI voiceover, music, video clips and render, on open-source models that cost cents

https://github.com/digitalsamba/claude-code-video-toolkit · commit 9b0c90d421d2 · scored 2026-11-14 · scoring prov-4+qual-2+sec-2

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Scores

Pillar Score Signal Confidence Coverage
AI provenance (estimated AI-generated share) 96 explicit 95% 100%
Code quality 60 weak 90% 100%
Security 50 poor 85% 100%

AI provenance

Explicit AI attribution on 96% of first-party code added; an estimated 96% including velocity signals.

AI tool Attributed commits Lines added
Claude Code 371 94,030

Current source lines last changed by AI-attributed commits: 70,869 of 73,421.

Findings per 1,000 lines AI-attributed Other Ratio
Quality 0.833 0.392 2.12x
Security 1.524 0.0 n/a
Month Lines added Attributed to AI
2025-12 25,963 100%
2026-01 5,019 100%
2026-02 7,052 96%
2026-03 12,162 97%
2026-04 4,303 100%
2026-05 3,419 84%
2026-06 2,351 100%
2026-08 8,403 91%
2026-09 132 100%
2026-10 13,594 87%
2026-11 15,310 100%

Evidence

AI provenance describes how code was produced; it is not a quality judgment. Unless attribution is explicit, these are signals consistent with AI generation, not proof. Squash/rebase workflows, imported code, and rewritten history reduce accuracy.

Code quality

Code quality is weak: test-to-source ratio 0.06, CI runs tests; 35% of function code in complex or long functions; 24% duplicated lines. Weakest area: duplication.

Area Score
Complexity (lizard) 34
Duplication 24
Code smells (Opengrep) 82
Tests and CI 78
Documentation 80
Type safety 66
Process (Scorecard review/maintenance) n/a

Most complex functions:

Security

Security posture is poor: 162 known vulnerabilities in 18 dependencies; 72 high-severity SAST findings; 38 high-severity workflow issues. Weakest area: ci actions.

Area Score
Secrets (gitleaks, tree + history) 100
Static analysis (Opengrep) 69
Vulnerable dependencies (OSV) 10
CI workflows (zizmor) 0
Posture (policy, updates, signing, lockfiles) 40
OpenSSF Scorecard n/a

Top findings

Severity Finding Location
critical osv/GHSA-5x8w-8jj5-q52h: pillow@10.0 (PyPI) is affected by PYSEC-2026-4330, GHSA-5x8w-8jj5-q52h tools/requirements.txt
critical osv/GHSA-8g5g-8vmr-9782: pillow@10.0 (PyPI) is affected by PYSEC-2026-4332, GHSA-8g5g-8vmr-9782 tools/requirements.txt
critical osv/GHSA-xvh5-g6gv-559v: pillow@10.0 (PyPI) is affected by PYSEC-2026-4363, GHSA-xvh5-g6gv-559v tools/requirements.txt
critical osv/GHSA-3f63-hfp8-52jq: pillow@10.0 (PyPI) is affected by PYSEC-2026-457, GHSA-3f63-hfp8-52jq tools/requirements.txt
critical osv/GHSA-332p-7hrc-92wf: pillow@10.0 (PyPI) is affected by GHSA-332p-7hrc-92wf tools/requirements.txt
critical osv/GHSA-w889-685w-c8fh: pillow@10.0 (PyPI) is affected by GHSA-w889-685w-c8fh tools/requirements.txt
critical osv/GHSA-82r6-8w77-94w6: anyio@4.13.0 (PyPI) is affected by PYSEC-2026-4025, GHSA-82r6-8w77-94w6 uv.lock
critical osv/GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2: certifi@2026.5.20 (PyPI) is affected by PYSEC-2026-4320, GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 uv.lock
critical osv/GHSA-5x8w-8jj5-q52h: pillow@11.3.0 (PyPI) is affected by PYSEC-2026-4330, GHSA-5x8w-8jj5-q52h uv.lock
critical osv/GHSA-8g5g-8vmr-9782: pillow@11.3.0 (PyPI) is affected by PYSEC-2026-4332, GHSA-8g5g-8vmr-9782 uv.lock
critical osv/GHSA-v9pv-5gc8-w2m6: pillow@11.3.0 (PyPI) is affected by PYSEC-2026-4339, GHSA-v9pv-5gc8-w2m6 uv.lock
critical osv/GHSA-xvh5-g6gv-559v: pillow@11.3.0 (PyPI) is affected by PYSEC-2026-4363, GHSA-xvh5-g6gv-559v uv.lock
critical osv/GHSA-332p-7hrc-92wf: pillow@11.3.0 (PyPI) is affected by GHSA-332p-7hrc-92wf uv.lock
critical osv/GHSA-w889-685w-c8fh: pillow@11.3.0 (PyPI) is affected by GHSA-w889-685w-c8fh uv.lock
high opengrep/python.django.security.injection.ssrf.ssrf-injection-requests: Data from request object is passed to a new server-side request. This could lead to a server-side request forgery (SSRF). To mitigate, ensure that schemes and hosts are validated against an allowlist, do not forward the response to the user, and ensure proper authentication and transport-layer secur [confidence medium] docker/modal-ltx2/app.py:591
high opengrep/python.django.security.injection.ssrf.ssrf-injection-requests: Data from request object is passed to a new server-side request. This could lead to a server-side request forgery (SSRF). To mitigate, ensure that schemes and hosts are validated against an allowlist, do not forward the response to the user, and ensure proper authentication and transport-layer secur [confidence medium] docker/modal-propainter/app.py:88
high opengrep/python.django.security.injection.ssrf.ssrf-injection-requests: Data from request object is passed to a new server-side request. This could lead to a server-side request forgery (SSRF). To mitigate, ensure that schemes and hosts are validated against an allowlist, do not forward the response to the user, and ensure proper authentication and transport-layer secur [confidence medium] docker/modal-propainter/app.py:90
high opengrep/python.lang.security.audit.dangerous-subprocess-use-audit: Detected subprocess function 'run' without a static string. If this data can be controlled by a malicious actor, it may be an instance of command injection. Audit the use of this call to ensure it is not controllable by an external resource. You may consider using 'shlex.escape()'. [confidence low] docker/modal-propainter/app.py:201
high opengrep/python.django.security.injection.ssrf.ssrf-injection-requests: Data from request object is passed to a new server-side request. This could lead to a server-side request forgery (SSRF). To mitigate, ensure that schemes and hosts are validated against an allowlist, do not forward the response to the user, and ensure proper authentication and transport-layer secur [confidence medium] docker/modal-sadtalker/app.py:151
high opengrep/python.django.security.injection.ssrf.ssrf-injection-requests: Data from request object is passed to a new server-side request. This could lead to a server-side request forgery (SSRF). To mitigate, ensure that schemes and hosts are validated against an allowlist, do not forward the response to the user, and ensure proper authentication and transport-layer secur [confidence medium] docker/modal-sadtalker/app.py:153
high opengrep/python.lang.security.audit.dangerous-subprocess-use-audit: Detected subprocess function 'run' without a static string. If this data can be controlled by a malicious actor, it may be an instance of command injection. Audit the use of this call to ensure it is not controllable by an external resource. You may consider using 'shlex.escape()'. [confidence low] docker/modal-sadtalker/app.py:276
high opengrep/python.django.security.injection.ssrf.ssrf-injection-requests: Data from request object is passed to a new server-side request. This could lead to a server-side request forgery (SSRF). To mitigate, ensure that schemes and hosts are validated against an allowlist, do not forward the response to the user, and ensure proper authentication and transport-layer secur [confidence medium] docker/modal-upscale/app.py:143
high opengrep/dockerfile.security.missing-user: By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'. [confidence medium] docker/runpod-propainter/Dockerfile:80
high opengrep/python.lang.security.audit.dangerous-subprocess-use-audit: Detected subprocess function 'run' without a static string. If this data can be controlled by a malicious actor, it may be an instance of command injection. Audit the use of this call to ensure it is not controllable by an external resource. You may consider using 'shlex.escape()'. [confidence low] docker/runpod-propainter/handler.py:417
high opengrep/dockerfile.security.missing-user: By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'. [confidence medium] docker/runpod-qwen3-tts/Dockerfile:54

Static signals only: the scorer never runs the project's code. Secret findings are pattern matches that were not verified, and secret values are never stored.

Repository profile

Language Lines
Python 44,863
TypeScript 31,173
JavaScript 1,511
Shell 16

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