eli1982/codex-bridge-desktop
Local Codex and ChatGPT bridge lifecycle app
- Repository: https://github.com/eli1982/codex-bridge-desktop
- Commit:
4c4bb4967bc186704b92256b57a41b9e23a45ea5 - Generated: 2026-11-13T23:59:11+00:00
- Scorer 0.1.0, scoring prov-4+qual-2+sec-2, report schema v2
Scores
| Pillar | Score | Signal | Confidence | Coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AI provenance (estimated AI-generated share) | 0 | none-detected | 42% | 100% |
| Code quality | 65 | adequate | 90% | 100% |
| Security | 72 | adequate | 85% | 100% |
AI provenance
No AI attribution or AI-consistent velocity signals detected.
- Explicitly attributed share (lower bound): 0.0%
- Unattributed share in AI-consistent velocity bursts: 0.0%
- Estimated AI-generated share: 0.0%
| Month | Lines added | Attributed to AI |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-10 | 2,345 | 0% |
AI provenance describes how code was produced; it is not a quality judgment. Unless attribution is explicit, these are signals consistent with AI generation, not proof. Squash/rebase workflows, imported code, and rewritten history reduce accuracy.
Code quality
Code quality is adequate: test-to-source ratio 0.08, CI runs tests; 12% of function code in complex or long functions; 0% duplicated lines. Weakest area: lint.
| Area | Score |
|---|---|
| Complexity (lizard) | 70 |
| Duplication | 100 |
| Code smells (Opengrep) | 4 |
| Tests and CI | 69 |
| Documentation | 100 |
| Type safety | 40 |
| Process (Scorecard review/maintenance) | n/a |
- Functions: 31; mean complexity 5.0, 90th percentile 12; 1 complex and 0 long functions
- Duplicated lines: 0.0% of 1,774 compared
- Tests: 168 test lines for 2,159 source lines (ratio 0.08); CI test commands: unittest; 100% of recent source commits also change tests
- Docs missing or thin: none
Most complex functions:
Security
Security posture is adequate: 2 high-severity SAST findings. Weakest area: posture.
| Area | Score |
|---|---|
| Secrets (gitleaks, tree + history) | 100 |
| Static analysis (Opengrep) | 40 |
| Vulnerable dependencies (OSV) | n/a |
| CI workflows (zizmor) | 91 |
| Posture (policy, updates, signing, lockfiles) | 40 |
| OpenSSF Scorecard | n/a |
- Posture checks passed: security policy, lockfiles; missing: dependency updates, signed commits
Top findings
| Severity | Finding | Location |
|---|---|---|
| high | opengrep/python.lang.security.audit.dangerous-subprocess-use-audit: Detected subprocess function 'Popen' without a static string. If this data can be controlled by a malicious actor, it may be an instance of command injection. Audit the use of this call to ensure it is not controllable by an external resource. You may consider using 'shlex.escape()'. [confidence low] |
unix/bridge.py:160 |
| high | opengrep/python.lang.security.audit.dangerous-subprocess-use-audit: Detected subprocess function 'Popen' without a static string. If this data can be controlled by a malicious actor, it may be an instance of command injection. Audit the use of this call to ensure it is not controllable by an external resource. You may consider using 'shlex.escape()'. [confidence low] |
unix/bridge.py:284 |
| medium | opengrep/python.lang.security.audit.dynamic-urllib-use-detected: Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead. [confidence low] |
scripts/ci_build_gate.py:32 |
| medium | opengrep/python.lang.security.audit.insecure-file-permissions: These permissions 0o700 are widely permissive and grant access to more people than may be necessary. A good default is 0o644 which gives read and write access to yourself and read access to everyone else. [confidence medium] |
unix/bridge.py:33 |
| medium | opengrep/python.lang.security.audit.dynamic-urllib-use-detected: Detected a dynamic value being used with urllib. urllib supports 'file://' schemes, so a dynamic value controlled by a malicious actor may allow them to read arbitrary files. Audit uses of urllib calls to ensure user data cannot control the URLs, or consider using the 'requests' library instead. [confidence low] |
unix/bridge.py:101 |
| medium | zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] |
.github/workflows/checks.yml:23 |
| medium | zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] |
.github/workflows/checks.yml:36 |
| medium | zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] |
.github/workflows/checks.yml:66 |
| medium | zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] |
.github/workflows/checks.yml:101 |
| low | zizmor/excessive-permissions: overly broad permissions [confidence high] |
.github/workflows/checks.yml:10 |
Static signals only: the scorer never runs the project's code. Secret findings are pattern matches that were not verified, and secret values are never stored.
Repository profile
- Source lines: 2,159; test lines: 168
| Language | Lines |
|---|---|
| PowerShell | 1,304 |
| Python | 714 |
| C# | 195 |
| Shell | 114 |