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github/gh-aw-mcpg

GitHub Agentic Workflows MCP Gateway

https://github.com/github/gh-aw-mcpg · commit 2ad55e19a00d · scored 2026-11-14 · scoring prov-4+qual-2+sec-2

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Scores

Pillar Score Signal Confidence Coverage
AI provenance (estimated AI-generated share) 86 explicit 95% 100%
Code quality 80 adequate 90% 100%
Security 71 adequate 85% 100%

AI provenance

Explicit AI attribution on 86% of first-party code added; an estimated 86% including velocity signals.

AI tool Attributed commits Lines added
GitHub Copilot coding agent 5,671 271,003
Claude Code 1 0

Current source lines last changed by AI-attributed commits: 63,298 of 67,195.

Findings per 1,000 lines AI-attributed Other Ratio
Quality 0.237 0.257 0.92x
Security 0.205 0.257 0.8x
Month Lines added Attributed to AI
2025-12 4,532 0%
2026-01 56,064 66%
2026-02 29,947 44%
2026-03 50,163 95%
2026-04 31,247 100%
2026-05 24,649 100%
2026-06 30,794 100%
2026-07 26,280 100%
2026-08 16,325 100%
2026-09 26,086 99%
2026-10 11,239 100%
2026-11 6,751 100%

Evidence

AI provenance describes how code was produced; it is not a quality judgment. Unless attribution is explicit, these are signals consistent with AI generation, not proof. Squash/rebase workflows, imported code, and rewritten history reduce accuracy.

Code quality

Code quality is adequate: test-to-source ratio 2.27, CI runs tests; 16% of function code in complex or long functions; 7% duplicated lines. Weakest area: type safety.

Area Score
Complexity (lizard) 63
Duplication 64
Code smells (Opengrep) 96
Tests and CI 100
Documentation 80
Type safety 40
Process (Scorecard review/maintenance) n/a

Most complex functions:

Security

Security posture is adequate: 7 known vulnerabilities in 1 dependencies; 4 high-severity SAST findings; 3 high-severity workflow issues. Weakest area: secrets.

Area Score
Secrets (gitleaks, tree + history) 31
Static analysis (Opengrep) 96
Vulnerable dependencies (OSV) 95
CI workflows (zizmor) 53
Posture (policy, updates, signing, lockfiles) 100
OpenSSF Scorecard n/a

Top findings

Severity Finding Location
high opengrep/dockerfile.security.missing-user-entrypoint: By not specifying a USER, a program in the container may run as 'root'. This is a security hazard. If an attacker can control a process running as root, they may have control over the container. Ensure that the last USER in a Dockerfile is a USER other than 'root'. [confidence medium] Dockerfile:141
high opengrep/go.lang.security.audit.dangerous-exec-command: Detected non-static command inside Command. Audit the input to 'exec.Command'. If unverified user data can reach this call site, this is a code injection vulnerability. A malicious actor can inject a malicious script to execute arbitrary code. [confidence low] internal/mcp/connection.go:131
high opengrep/go.lang.security.audit.dangerous-exec-command: Detected non-static command inside Command. Audit the input to 'exec.Command'. If unverified user data can reach this call site, this is a code injection vulnerability. A malicious actor can inject a malicious script to execute arbitrary code. [confidence low] internal/sys/docker.go:53
high opengrep/go.lang.security.audit.dangerous-exec-command: Detected non-static command inside Command. Audit the input to 'exec.Command'. If unverified user data can reach this call site, this is a code injection vulnerability. A malicious actor can inject a malicious script to execute arbitrary code. [confidence low] internal/testutil/mcptest/driver.go:104
high zizmor/template-injection: code injection via template expansion [confidence high] .github/workflows/container.yml:37
high zizmor/dangerous-triggers: use of fundamentally insecure workflow trigger [confidence medium] .github/workflows/plan.lock.yml:57
high zizmor/dangerous-triggers: use of fundamentally insecure workflow trigger [confidence medium] .github/workflows/repo-assist.lock.yml:75
medium opengrep/go.lang.security.audit.xss.no-direct-write-to-responsewriter: Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'. [confidence low] internal/httputil/httputil.go:26
medium opengrep/go.lang.security.audit.crypto.missing-ssl-minversion: MinVersion is missing from this TLS configuration. By default, TLS 1.2 is currently used as the minimum when acting as a client, and TLS 1.0 when acting as a server. General purpose web applications should default to TLS 1.3 with all other protocols disabled. Only where it is known that a web se [confidence high] internal/mcp/connection.go:249
medium opengrep/go.lang.security.audit.xss.no-direct-write-to-responsewriter: Detected directly writing or similar in 'http.ResponseWriter.write()'. This bypasses HTML escaping that prevents cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Instead, use the 'html/template' package and render data using 'template.Execute()'. [confidence low] internal/proxy/handler.go:566
medium osv/GO-2026-6603: golang.org/x/net@0.59.0 (Go) is affected by GO-2026-6603 go.mod
medium osv/GO-2026-6610: golang.org/x/net@0.59.0 (Go) is affected by GO-2026-6610 go.mod
medium osv/GO-2026-6611: golang.org/x/net@0.59.0 (Go) is affected by GO-2026-6611 go.mod
medium osv/GO-2026-6612: golang.org/x/net@0.59.0 (Go) is affected by GO-2026-6612 go.mod
medium osv/GO-2026-6617: golang.org/x/net@0.59.0 (Go) is affected by GO-2026-6617 go.mod
medium osv/GO-2026-6860: golang.org/x/net@0.59.0 (Go) is affected by GO-2026-6860 go.mod
medium osv/GO-2026-6866: golang.org/x/net@0.59.0 (Go) is affected by GO-2026-6866 go.mod
medium zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] .github/workflows/ci.yml:17
medium zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] .github/workflows/ci.yml:68
medium zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] .github/workflows/ci.yml:105
medium zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] .github/workflows/ci.yml:144
medium zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] .github/workflows/ci.yml:182
medium zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] .github/workflows/container.yml:17
medium zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] .github/workflows/rebuild-smoke-codex.yml:17
medium zizmor/artipacked: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts [confidence low] .github/workflows/rebuild-smoke-copilot.yml:22

Static signals only: the scorer never runs the project's code. Secret findings are pattern matches that were not verified, and secret values are never stored.

Repository profile

Language Lines
Go 190,264
Rust 25,969
Shell 3,364
Python 46

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